STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

Final Report
Correctional Facility RFP Evaluations

March 2013
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July 2012, The State of New Hampshire selected MGT of America, to assist the state in reviewing and evaluating private vendor proposals for the construction and operation of a male correctional facility and a hybrid (male and female) facility. A total of seventeen different proposals were received from four private vendors. Additionally, MGT was to provide a business case assessment and evaluation of the state cost of corrections operation of the prisons versus private operations of the facilities.

This final report should not be seen as the complete body of MGT’s work on this project. In fact, the majority of MGT’s work has been previously submitted in extensive detailed analysis provided under separate cover. The specific requirements of the project included:

- **Detailed Evaluation of the Design/Build Components of the Private Proposals**: MGT has provided the state with a detailed analysis of each proposal submitted to determine whether these proposals comply with both the design and construction requirements of the RFP’s as well as nationally accepted correctional design and construction standards. MGT employed an expert in correctional design and construction to evaluate the proposals and provided over 100 pages of analysis and summary of design/build compliance under separate cover.

- **Evaluation of the Operational Components of the Private Proposals**: MGT’s review also conducted a detailed review of the proposals to determine whether they met the operational requirements of the RFP and were compliant with the numerous court orders and consent decrees that govern the state’s correctional operations. MGT provided nearly 200 pages of detailed analysis concerning compliance with the operational requirements of the RFP’s.

- **Financial Analysis**: The review also required MGT develop a complex financial model and develop a business case analysis to compare the cost of private construction and operation of the correctional facilities to the states current and future costs. This analysis would extract the pricing provided by the private vendors and compare it to the state’s cost of operating the correctional facilities. Under separate cover, MGT did provide a draft model that met this requirement in September 2012, however, given concerns over the compliance of the proposals to the RFP requirements, the state subsequently requested the model be altered. The revised predictive model has been developed and submitted to the state and provides a 20 year projection of the state’s cost of operation.

This final report therefore has a limited scope, as requested by the state, and serves to supplement the information previously provided. In this final report, MGT has provided the following:

- Background on MGT’s design/build evaluation of the proposals.

- Description of MGT’s operational evaluation of the proposals.

- Description of the financial model and some general findings resulting from it.
• Business Case Assessment with analysis related to Cost, Compliance and Feasibility.

• Comparative evaluation of prison construction costs across the country.

Financial Model. Per the requirements of the RFP, MGT originally produced a draft financial model that would provide a baseline of state costs that could be compared to the costs in the vendor proposals. The model classified state costs into the cost categories identical to the vendors’ submissions. After this model was developed, the state requested it be revised and repurposed due to the fact that an accurate assessment of the private vendors’ costs could not be determined because all proposals appeared to have significant areas of non-compliance relative to their operational plans and/or their design/build proposals. For the revised model the state provided MGT with the baseline data that included FY2012 actual costs and future capital expenditures for FY2014-2019. Based on this information the new financial model was developed and submitted in early March 2013 and projected the operating costs by facility for the next 20 years. Additionally, it developed a Net Cost per Inmate for the total population and broken by male and female offenders. The table below identifies the Net Cost per Inmate and displays the projected increase in these rates over the next 20 years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net Cost per Inmate per Year</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2012 Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 36,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 37,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2033 Projected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male 61,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female 74,631</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+68%</td>
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<td>+99%</td>
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Business Case Assessment and State Benchmarking. MGT identified three elements to its business case analysis:

• Cost: Do the responses to the RFP’s provide an opportunity to achieve significant savings from the state’s current business model?

• Compliance: Do the proposals meet the state’s requirements as stipulated in the RFP’s?

• Feasibility: Are any identified benefits and/or cost savings from privatization realistic and sustainable?

As mentioned earlier, MGT had conducted and previously submitted a detailed analysis of the vendors compliance with the design build and operational requirements of the RFP’s and found significant issues with all the proposals. As a result, it was determined that the private vendor’s proposed prices may be understated, as those prices did not account for all the RFP requirements. This fact therefore made it impossible to conduct an accurate apples-to-apples cost comparison of state vs. private operation of correctional facilities.

In addition to issues of compliance with the RFP’s, MGT also conducted an initial evaluation of whether the proposals were realistic and feasible in the State of New Hampshire. In prior studies MGT has conducted regarding privatization, we have found private correctional facilities with annual staff turnover rates as high as 42 percent. High turnover, which often result from lower compensation levels can impact the skills and stability of the workforce and have a direct impact on the safety and security of facility operations. For this study, MGT compared the average compensation level (salary plus benefits) for security staff at the Concord State Prison versus the average compensation for these positions in the
lowest cost vendor proposal. MGT found that the private vendor’s proposal presented an annual compensation for security staff that was one-half of the current compensation currently paid to similar positions in the state. These lower pay levels may be more effective in southern and western states where many private facilities are located and where there are higher levels of unemployment and generally lower wage levels than found in New England. New Hampshire’s seasonable adjusted unemployment rate for December 2012 was 5.7 percent, while the South experienced a rate of 7.2 percent and the West was 8.6 percent. Additionally, New Hampshire’s median household income is the second highest of all the 50 states. The state should be concerned that this significantly lower wage may make it difficult to maintain a trained and experienced staff. This could result in high turnover and ultimately impact the safety and security of the correctional facilities.

While the business case analysis indicates that the vendor proposals may produce future cost savings for the state, the proposals fail to meet compliance requirements and feasibility standards. As a result, the state must address significant issues in these areas prior to being able to make a definitive decision on privatization. In order to accurately determine the cost savings that can be achieved through privatization of the states correctional facilities, further analysis is required that would ensure that the private proposals meet the requirements of the RFPs, specifically as it relates to consent decree and legal requirements, as well as presenting a salary structure that will allow for the recruitment and retention of qualified and capable staff.

Throughout this study, MGT had the pleasure of working with numerous staff from the Department of Corrections and the Administrative Services. We found individuals who were professional and dedicated to the difficult tasks at hand. The many staff we interviewed in the Department of Corrections put in outstanding effort in independently evaluating the vendor proposals and providing us with valuable information. Those in Administrative Services who directed this project were proficient and responsive to our questions and were valued participants in the completion of this work.

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1 Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012
2 US Census Bureau
DESIGN/BUILD EVALUATION

An extensive evaluation of the design/build aspect of all proposals was completed and submitted in September 2012. The review assessed the design/construction aspects of the proposals to make a determination whether or not the proposals met the RFP requirements, by conducting a thorough analysis of the proposals, various professional standards, and consent decrees/court orders. Along with the analysis, the State required MGT to provide supporting documentation that explains why the proposed construction, layout, or specifications do not comply.

MGT identified two core areas to evaluate the design/build aspect of the proposals:

- **Compliance with RFP, court orders, consent decrees and American Correctional Association (ACA) requirements.** MGT’s review compared the detail of the vendor submissions to the requirements of the RFP, including those requirements in the consent decrees and court orders that regulate the state’s corrections department as well as to the correctional standards published by the American Correctional Association. For each proposal, and as a means of comparison, MGT totaled the number of areas of non-compliance with these requirements.

- **Ratings on Five Key Construction Components.** MGT’s evaluation rated the proposals on five important correctional design components. These five areas were:

  - Security Sight Lines Rating – Are there appropriate site lines in the interior of the buildings and exterior including the perimeter?
  - Perimeter Penetration Rating – Does the perimeter design reduce the ability for penetration?
  - Functional Flow of Services and Inmate Routes Rating – Does the design layout provide for a logical flow of inmate traffic and reduce areas of congestion and the need for routes to cross?
  - Maintenance Total Rating – Do the materials and method of construction reduce future maintenance expenses? There are three components evaluated in determining the Maintenance Total Rating:
    - Building Maintenance Rating – Evaluates whether the type of building construction increases or decreases future maintenance costs.
    - HVAC Maintenance Rating – Evaluates whether the type of HVAC system and layout will result in higher lifecycle maintenance costs.
    - Security Controls Maintenance Rating – Evaluates whether the type of security controls increases or decreases future maintenance costs.
Flexibility – What is the potential to modify or subdivide the facility in the future?

MGT’s evaluation determined that all vendor proposals had areas of non-compliance with these requirements and had failings in the key construction component review. MGT provided the state a detailed matrix that identified every area of suspected non-compliance with the design build requirements. For every area of suspected non-compliance, MGT also provided a justification supporting the finding. Additionally a summary matrix was prepared and submitted that presented an overview of each proposals areas of non-compliance. MGT notes that proposals may have generally stated that the vendor would comply with all requirements, but the detail in the narrative did not support compliance, or was found failing to meet specific requirements. In these cases MGT, per direction of the state, marked the specific component non-compliant.
MGT’s second area of analysis involved a review of vendor operational plans for compliance with RFP requirements, various professional standards, as well as existing court orders/consent decrees, along with a requirement to provide a detailed summary of any items in the proposed operational and staffing plans that were not in compliance with the various requirements.

The MGT project work plan called for a series of analyses that would determine the level of compliance on operational matters of the various proposals in comparison to the RFP requirements, which also include compliance with court order/consent decrees, and Attachment E of the RFPs. Attachment E includes a specific set of elements that were required in the RFP and there was an expectation that the proposers would indicate tasks and deliverables that would demonstrate compliance with the various elements included in the attachment. Similarly, it was expected the proposers would outline their plans and staff deployment to demonstrate compliance with the various court orders and the content of the RFP.

MGT staff developed a summary template including a series of matrices designed to measure compliance with the elements referenced above for either the hybrid proposals or proposals for the male facility. Categories were further refined into operational elements with which the proposals needed to comply. The categories analyzed were wide ranging and covered the following subjects.

- Administration
- Staffing
- Training and Personnel
- Security
- Drug testing
- Transportation
- Safety and Health
- Inmate Reception and Release Procedures
- Inmate Records
- Health Services
- Behavioral Health Services
- Secure Psychiatric Unit
- Programming Requirements
- Educational Programs
- Correctional Industries
- Fiscal Matters
- Court Orders/Consent Decrees
- Food Services

Each of the elements was rated as either being in compliance or being noncompliant with the requirement. In rare instances, where the reviewers assessed that a decision on compliance was “too close to call”, a “no determination” was made with respect to compliance.

There were 17 overall proposals submitted, pursuant to the three RFPs, and their scope of services ranged from providing facility construction only with the state operating, or complete construction and operation of a facility. In accordance with the various options, certain vendors chose to propose renovating the existing prison in Concord, New Hampshire. All of the vendor proposals were either for the male or hybrid facility. None submitted proposals for a female only facility. In this operational review and with the approval of the state, we chose to evaluate one proposal for a hybrid facility and one proposal for a male facility from each vendor, rather than evaluate each of the 17 proposals. The
reason for this is that the operational plan lacked any significant variation from one submittal to another. The only variation was between the hybrid submittal and the male submittal. The bottom line is that if a company submitted two proposals for a hybrid facility, the operational plans for each were essentially the same.

MGT was given instructions early on to not re-score the proposals, but provide an over-the-shoulder review of the state’s analysis of the private vendor proposals. This meant that we should not be independently rescoring the vendor proposals, but evaluating the analysis and work of the state reviewers to ensure it was accurate and comprehensive. However, our ability to conduct an over-the-shoulder review was somewhat limited by the lack of comments or justifications to support much of the scoring conducted by the state’s proposal reviewers. In some areas, such as the state’s evaluation of the Medical and Program medical components of the proposals comments and narrative were included that strongly supported to the scores given. Others, however, lacked any narrative supporting the final scores. In these instances, MGT was unable to provide an over-the-shoulder review that ensured the reviews completed by the state reviewer were accurate and comprehensive, without digging into significant detail of each proposal and rescoring the proposals in some manner. This was especially true in MGT’s design build review. To meet this expanded work, we utilized instrumentation and scoring data that the state’s subject matter experts completed as reference in making our determinations on compliance levels. In some cases our findings were in agreement with the state’s subject matter expert (SME) reviewers, and in other cases they were not.

Early on in the project the MGT Operational Review Team met with the Assistant Commissioner of Corrections and a number of his subordinate staff, to include those involved in the scoring of the proposals, to discuss their proposal review methodology and findings. Those meetings proved fruitful in obtaining information on the intricacies of the New Hampshire corrections system and the various compliance areas mandated by statute, administrative rule, policy, court order, or interagency agreement. New Hampshire, like many states in the nation, has been heavily regulated as a result of litigation leading to court orders and consent decrees. One of these decrees dates back 34 years and has been clarified and revised by subsequent court decisions, thus creating complex and prescriptive requirements that must be met by the proposers.

MGT found that all of the proposals had some deficiencies from an operational standpoint. In some cases, the proposer failed to submit content that was required in the RFP or in Attachment E. In other cases, the proposers chose to reference that some of the services would be provided by a subcontract with another vendor, but failed to describe in detail how the subcontractor would provide the services. Another area where the proposers appear to have difficulties was with describing compliance with the various court orders/consent decrees. In most proposals, the vendor made a general statement that they intended to comply with the court order, but failed to submit sufficient content that described how compliance would be attained. One specific area where the proposers appeared to have difficulties was with the staffing requirements. We found cases where the proposed facility was staffed to provide for indirect supervision, which is not preferred by New Hampshire. In other cases, the vendor submitted proposals that didn’t meet the mandated staffing levels of the major court orders or consent decrees. Some of the vendors had difficulty responding with Correctional Industries mandates. A number of the proposals lacked sufficient content to describe the programs, staffing levels, and number of inmate seats available in the programs. Furthermore, the Laaman and Lepine consent decrees require specific program responses that a number of the proposers failed to recognize and this caused a noncompliance finding on those elements.
There are certainly a number of strengths in the proposals that we reviewed. For example, three out of the four companies have excellent records on achieving accreditation at the facilities they manage. Additionally, they have impressive policies and procedures, as well as comprehensive security protocols, which are necessary to receive accreditation. One proposer submitted a robust plan for behavioral health, which was rich in content and provided a staffing pattern that will meet most of the requirements of the state. A number of the proposers presented training plans that met or exceeded the State’s requirements.
FINANCIAL MODEL

New Hampshire desired that the cost to operate privately constructed and operated facilities be compared to the state’s costs to operate their existing correctional facilities. In September 2012, MGT developed a complex financial model to compare the cost of private construction and operation of the state’s facilities to the states current and future costs. This analysis would extract the pricing provided by the private vendors and compare it to the state’s cost of operating the correctional facilities. However, since all the private vendor proposals failed to meet significant RFP requirements, the state subsequently requested the model be altered. A repurposed model has since been developed and submitted to the state and provides a comprehensive 20 year projection of the state’s cost of operation broken by facility and major cost category.

As a baseline of data for the projections, the State of New Hampshire provided MGT with the following items:

- FY 2012 operating costs by category of cost, and by facility.
- FY 2012 operating revenues by facility.
- December 2012 census data on each existing facility.

To assist with the projections, the state also provided the following for expected future changes to operations:

- Projected census data for future years that coincides with the classification and movement of prisoners between existing and new facilities.
- Capital requirements for the next 20 years that identifies the cost of upgrading and repairing existing facilities, and for constructing new facilities.
- Projected debt service schedules associated with each of the capital requirement projects.
- Operating impacts of the new facilities anticipated for construction. These costs are meant to reflect the increased ongoing operating costs associated with the construction and operation of new facilities.

Utilizing the baseline data, MGT created a 20 year projection model that adjusts the costs and revenues by category and facility assuming a 2.5% annual inflation rate. The model also includes adjustments in the appropriate years for each of the projected capital requirements – including both the expected debt service payment and increase in operating costs, if any, associated with each planned project. In the fiscal years that the new facilities are projected to be operational, the inmate census data was adjusted to correspond with the movement of prisoners between facilities, and for the increase in the expected number of total prisoners housed.

The projections resulted in two detailed reports that were previously provided to the state:
• **MGT 20 Year Detail:** This report shows the operating costs by facility by year for the next 20 years in the same format that the baseline FY 2012 data was provided. Much of this worksheet is formula driven and will automatically recalculate if the FY 2012 baseline cost data, capital requirements, debt payments, or census data is modified. This allows the state to conduct comparative what-if analysis for different scenarios.

• **MGT 20 Year Summary:** This report is a summary of the MGT 20 Year Details report and displays costs by category of expense and by gender of inmate. The primary difference between this and the detailed report is the summary report does not display the cost projections at the facility level.

The financial model demonstrates that the net cost to house all inmates by NHDOC is expected to rise from the FY 12 baseline cost of $36,508 per year to $62,055 per year in FY 33 – an increase of 70%.

The detailed matrixes developed by MGT provide significant projections for the future cost to operate correctional facilities and forecasts of major categories of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (NHDOC) expenditures.
BUSINESS CASE ASSESSMENT

The business case analysis of privatization in the New Hampshire Department of Corrections (NHDOC) assesses whether it is in the basic interests of the state to privatize a substantial portion of the operations of the state prison system, as called for in the RFP’s issued by the state in late 2011. There are three core elements to our analysis:

1. **Cost**: Do the responses to the RFP’s provide an opportunity to achieve significant savings from the state’s current business model?

2. **Compliance**: Do the proposals meet the state’s requirements as stipulated in the RFP’s?

3. **Feasibility**: Are any identified benefits and/or cost savings from privatization realistic and sustainable?

Our approach to this analysis seeks to establish the degree to which private operation of correctional facilities may result in less total government spending than the State’s management of the current correctional system, given a specified standard of operational performance.

This approach represents a modified version of the privatization assessment methodology developed by the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB), currently described in OMB Circular A-76. This methodology works backward from the known costs associated with prison system operations, comparing the actual costs to government of its current operations with the projected total system costs of incorporating contracted facilities into its business model.

1. **Cost Analysis**

The A-76 assessment methodology begins first with definition of current system costs. In order to establish a baseline for comparison, MGT developed the financial model discussed earlier, which is a comprehensive cost projection for the state correctional system that identifies current business model expenditures for the next twenty years. The projection makes two key assumptions, 1) that system costs and revenues will grow over time, consistent with a 2.5% annual cost inflation rate; and 2) that the correctional system will require significant capital investments to assure the operational integrity of current facilities and to create new male transitional center and female correctional center capacity. In total, we project these capital investments will total $79.7 million (approximately 94 percent of this spending goes to build a new women’s correctional facility and four new male transitional centers).

The cost projection shows that over the next twenty years the operation of the New Hampshire correctional system in its current configuration will cost the state $2.88 billion. While MGT considers this an accurate prediction given the assumptions provided, we caution against comparing it directly to private proposal costs or other scenarios without first understanding the underlying costs that make up this number. The assumptions in this total amount must be fully understood and in some cases these underlying costs must be reallocated between the proposal/scenario and the state operation before any accurate comparison can be made. These assumptions and underlying costs include but are not limited to:
The security level of the facility and inmate population affected. The costs associated with the proposal or scenario could vary greatly based on the security level of the facility or inmate population that is affected. Higher security level facilities and inmate populations generally are more costly to operate.

Fixed costs that remain the responsibility of the state correctional system even after award of a proposal or implementation of a new operational scenario. Even if facilities are privatized, many fixed costs will remain the state’s responsibility and these costs must be accurately delineated in any comparison.

2. Compliance Analysis

The second element of the business case analysis is a determination of the degree to which the proposals in question meet the operational requirements established by the state. The fact that a given business model may produce cost savings is irrelevant if the model does not comply with the policies, standards, and other requirements that define the operating environment for the NHDOC.

Based on our detailed analysis submitted earlier the proposals examined do not appear to comply with many key requirements established by the state in its RFP’s. Non-compliance in many of these areas may place the state in jeopardy of violating court order and court consent decree requirements.

3. Feasibility Analysis

The final component of the business case analysis examined the degree to which the proposals under review employed realistic assumptions that can result in actionable plans that achieve the cost savings proposed and meet the physical plant and operational standards required by the state.

As an example, our analysis found the compensation level for a correctional officer in a vendor proposal to be significantly lower than what the state currently pays in salary and benefits. This raises questions as to whether the vendor can recruit and retain qualified staff at the compensation levels proposed. We recognize that many privately operated facilities are located in southern and western states with higher levels of unemployment and generally lower wage levels than found in the New England area. This background could lead the company to under-estimate the compensation levels required to maintain a qualified, stable correctional officer workforce for the proposed facility.

This is a significant issue. In prior MGT studies of private correctional facility operations, we have found private correctional facilities with annual staff turnover rates of 42 percent compared to 13.3 percent for nearby public facilities. High turnover, which can result from non-competitive compensation levels, produces a chronically inexperienced work force with direct implications for the integrity of facility security and safety. Low compensation levels can also make staff recruitment more difficult, resulting in staff vacancies and reliance on overtime, which again has a negative impact upon facility security. In order to address the question of whether the officer compensation levels proposed by vendors are sufficient to assure an adequate workforce, additional research on the labor market in southern New Hampshire is required.

4. Conclusion

This business case analysis indicates that the proposals may produce significant future cost savings for the state. However the proposals fail to meet compliance and feasibility standards. As such the business
case analysis indicates that the state must address significant issues in these areas prior to making any future decision on privatization in the New Hampshire correctional system.
CONSTRUCTION COST BENCHMARKS

As part of our review we identified benchmarks for prison construction costs. New Hampshire requested this information to give them a baseline understanding of the cost to construct correctional facilities across the country. To accomplish this, MGT polled numerous sources of prison construction data to identify where facilities were built and the type and cost of construction. MGT found limited available data relative to the construction costs for prison facilities completed since the year 2000. This is likely due to the fact that after the prison population boom of the 1980’s and 1990’s had ended, few new prison facilities were constructed by states. In fact, during the last decade several states had begun closing facilities as a way of reducing correctional budgets. As a result, their capital programs have been essentially maintenance and specific need projects. The exception has been the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) which continued their facility expansion initiative.

MGT has found data on fourteen construction examples that span from 2000 – 2012. This information is provided in the table on the following page. Since much of the data available is aged, inflation factors, regional construction cost indexes and a conversion factor have been applied to each project to provide costs as they could reasonably be for a similar type project located in Concord, New Hampshire in the year 2012.

MGT found wide variance in the average construction cost per bed, even between facilities that house the same classification of offenders. For example, the cost per bed for a maximum security facility constructed in Illinois in 2003 was $97,169.62 while the cost per bed for a Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP) maximum security facility constructed in Kentucky was $247,546.57. It should be noted that little or no data was found relative to programs and program spaces in these respective institutions. However, the square feet area per bed can be used as a measure of the probable richness of program activities and space. It is also noted that the costs per square foot tend to increase with higher square feet per inmate, another indication of probable program richness. In the example above, the cost per square foot of the Illinois facility was $249.93 while the cost per square foot of the FBOP facility was nearly 35% higher ($337.45).

In total for the fourteen facilities, the average area per bed was 436.48 square feet, the average construction cost per square foot (adjusted) was $312.03, and average facility construction cost per bed was $137,166.74.
## Construction Cost Comparison

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of Beds</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>1864</td>
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<td>632</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>No data</td>
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<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>$96,647,000</td>
<td>$114,000,000</td>
<td>$111,355,000</td>
<td>$89,487,928</td>
<td>$64,400,000</td>
<td>$14,600,000</td>
<td>$21,870,800</td>
<td>$121,000,000</td>
<td>$190,000,000</td>
<td>$70,000,000</td>
<td>$143,810,161</td>
<td>$87,188,300</td>
<td>$246,000,000</td>
<td>$43,614,436</td>
<td>$103,283,830</td>
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<td>Total sq. ft.</td>
<td>418,688</td>
<td>657,289</td>
<td>795,000</td>
<td>518,190</td>
<td>364,563</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>117,200</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>459,117</td>
<td>645,714</td>
<td>886,768</td>
<td>285,836</td>
<td>445,312</td>
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<td>Cost per bed</td>
<td>$107,388</td>
<td>$162,946</td>
<td>$61,864</td>
<td>$93,217</td>
<td>$67,083</td>
<td>$135,385</td>
<td>$87,483</td>
<td>$60,500</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
<td>$175,000</td>
<td>$99,592</td>
<td>$46,775</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
<td>$42,592</td>
<td>$102,830</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sq. ft. per bed</td>
<td>465.21</td>
<td>731.58</td>
<td>441.67</td>
<td>560.63</td>
<td>139.75</td>
<td>518.52</td>
<td>468.80</td>
<td>200.00</td>
<td>315.79</td>
<td>525.00</td>
<td>317.95</td>
<td>346.41</td>
<td>558.35</td>
<td>279.14</td>
<td>436.48</td>
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<td>Cost per s.f.</td>
<td>$230.83</td>
<td>$222.12</td>
<td>$140.07</td>
<td>$166.28</td>
<td>$176.65</td>
<td>$260.71</td>
<td>$186.61</td>
<td>$302.50</td>
<td>$316.67</td>
<td>$333.33</td>
<td>$313.23</td>
<td>$135.03</td>
<td>$358.20</td>
<td>$152.59</td>
<td>$235.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation cost factor</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>55.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional cost factor</td>
<td>103.5%</td>
<td>96.6%</td>
<td>90.3%</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>103.8%</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>84.2%</td>
<td>100.8%</td>
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<td>88.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord, N.H. adjustment factor</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>101.1%</td>
<td>108.2%</td>
<td>110.0%</td>
<td>111.9%</td>
<td>94.1%</td>
<td>106.0%</td>
<td>114.8%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>100.4%</td>
<td>116.0%</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>111.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord adjusted cost per s.f. (2012)</td>
<td>$334.54</td>
<td>$337.25</td>
<td>$220.03</td>
<td>$249.91</td>
<td>$303.51</td>
<td>$368.60</td>
<td>$287.10</td>
<td>$371.95</td>
<td>$330.66</td>
<td>$358.47</td>
<td>$373.12</td>
<td>$203.64</td>
<td>$383.63</td>
<td>$245.96</td>
<td>$312.03</td>
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<td>Concord adjusted cost per bed (2012)</td>
<td>$155,629.78</td>
<td>$247,401.35</td>
<td>$97,180.94</td>
<td>$140,105.52</td>
<td>$115,259.51</td>
<td>$119,127.73</td>
<td>$134,593.41</td>
<td>$74,389.12</td>
<td>$104,418.93</td>
<td>$188,195.32</td>
<td>$118,632.90</td>
<td>$70,543.61</td>
<td>$214,200.00</td>
<td>$68,656.23</td>
<td>$237,166.74</td>
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**Note:** Inflation factors used are based on U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Reclamation "Structures and Improvements" published in 2012. Regional construction cost indexes used are based on R.S. Means Cost Data 2013. Conversion factors are the New Hampshire regional cost index divided by the regional cost index of the subject project location.